Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave the Army a clear directive—design a leaner and more lethal force with better long-range precision fires, air and missile defenses, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, and counter-space capabilities. These are expensive priorities requiring significant changes to the Army’s force structure. The Army cancelled the M10 Booker and procurement of older attack helicopters (AH-64D Apache) but plans to develop a new manned tank; however, Army leaders should consider substantial divestment of manned attack aviation and manned tanks. Generals and soldiers, including the authors, love Apache attack helicopters and M1 Abrams tanks, which represent raw combat power and U.S. technological dominance of the twentieth century. However, today’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats, proliferating advanced air defenses, and other threats in every domain demand rethinking the Army’s force structure at every level. Winning modern combat requires lethal, relatively cheap, strategically agile (i.e., between continents), and tactically agile (i.e., on the battlefield) weapon systems that industry can quickly produce in large numbers. Agility becomes especially important in an unpredictable world where threats and the president determine where the Army operates, not the Army’s desire or force structure. The next adversary could be cartels, China, or something else.
